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This would seem to reach a desirable result. If the
wife can show that conditions have changed and the husband is capable of paying those amounts, and the actions
of the wife warrant such payment, then such debts could
again be allowed. (In the cited case the Court stated that
the wife could at any time have the husband up for contempt, unless he could show the financial inability which
was alleged by him. It probably would be better if the
'in abeyance' decree were more controlling.) This treatment would keep the entire matter within the conscience
of the Court, with an elastic standard, but with the outside effect of finality. The decree would not be modifiable
as to past amounts, the Court merely would not recognize
the right of the wife to get beneficial effect from the decree, i. e., would not hold the husband in contempt.
In conclusion, it might be suggested that, in view of the
effect of this decision and of the fact that the law announced was not really necessary, nor was it applied, but
was actually dictum, the Court in considering future cases
on this point can, without any earthshaking results, ignore
and override this decision by following the interpretation
indicated in such earlier and sounder cases as Rosenberg
v. Rosenberg and Kalben v. King.
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR-THE EFFECT OF
DEVIATION ON THE "SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT"
A. S. A bell Co. v. Sopher 1
Defendant appealed from a judgment of the trial court
holding it liable for the negligence of its servant. The
testimony was uncontradicted, and the defendant-appellant contends that the trial court should have ruled as a
matter of law that it was not liable. The evidence established that the employee of defendant set out from defendant's place of business, driving defendant's truck, to
deliver proof to various customers. He delivered proof to
some of the assigned places, the last of which was in the
2100 block of West Lafayette Street. From that point he
proceeded to Gwynn Oak Junction, a distance of about
fifteen blocks (approximately' 2/2 miles), where he picked
up a package which he intended to deliver to his mother
who lived at 3806 Granada Avenue. On his way to his
122 A. (2d) 462 (Md., 1941).
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mother's, at the corner of Main and Granada, the accident
occurred. There were other packages of proof still on the
truck at the time of the accident, which were to be delivered to Druid Hill Avenue, the North Avenue Market,
and the 1700 block of North Charles Street. The Court
of Appeals held as a matter of law that the employee was
not acting within the scope of his employment, and reversed the judgment for the plaintiff without a new trial.
This case merits notation more because of the prevalence of this particular type of situation, than on account
of any inherent difficulty in the law involved. Deviations,
stop-off s, and the intermixing of business and pleasure
are every-day occurrences. In which cases can the employer be held liable under the doctrine of respcndeat
superior, and in which cases is he relieved of responsibility? The rules of thumb seem to be disarmingly simple.
If an employee, engaged in his employer's business, and
acting within the scope of his employment commits an act
of negligence, notwithstanding the fact that he has joined
therewith some private business or purpose of his own,
the employer is liable.' However, if the employee deviates
to such an extent as to constitute a complete abandonment
of his employment (either permanent or temporary) for
his own purposes, the employer cannot be held liable.
The Court of Appeals in the principal case states that
"when the undisputed, and uncontradicted evidence clearly
discloses that a servant has committed an act of negligence,
at a time when he is not acting within the scope of his
employment, the question of the employer's liability should
not be allowed to go to the Jury, but becomes properly a
question for the Court. '4 But what evidence, even undis239 C. J., Master and Servant, Sec. 1494:
". . . where the servant is
notwithstanding the deviation, engaged in the master's business within the
scope of his employment, it is immaterial that he joined with this some
private business or purpose of his own." McDowell v. Magazine Service,
164 Md. 170, 164 A. 148 (1933); Mech v. Storrs, 169 Md. 150, 179 A. 525

(1935).

'39 C. J., Master and Servant, Sec. 1493; Symington v. Sipes, 121 Md.
313, 88 A. 134, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662 (1913) ; Pollock v. Watts, 142 Md.
403, 121 A. 238 (1923) ; Fletcher v. Meredith, 148 Md. 580, 129 A. 795, 45
A. L. R. 474 (1925) ; Trautman v. Warfield-Rohr, 151 Md. 417, 135 A. 180
(1926) ; Wagner v. Page, 179 Md. 465, 20 A. (2d) 164 (1941).
For older
cases expressing the general agency doctrine concerning "scope of employment", see Evans v. Davidson, 53 Md. 245, 36 Am. Rep. 400 (1880) ; Railway Co. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 257, 14 A. 709, 9 Am. St. Rep. 425 (1888);
Beiswanger v. American Bonding Co., 98 Md. 287, 57 A. 202 (1904) ; Steinman v. Laundry Co., 109 Md. 62, 71 A. 517, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884 (1908).
' Citing McDowell v. Magazine Service, supra, n. 2; Wells v. Hecht Bros.
& Co., 155 Md. 618, 142 A. 258 (1928) ; International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md.
34, 127 A. 647 (1925) ; and 22 C. J. 124.
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puted, will be sufficient to prove that the servant was not
acting within the scope of his employment. Each case
must be determined on its own facts, and for this reason
when we turn to case law we find that "the decisions are
in such hopeless confusion that it is useless to attempt a
review of them with any idea that they can be reconciled." 5
The physical extent of the deviation must be considered
in conjunction with the attendant circumstances, since the
intent of the employee as determined thereby is one of
the prime factors in all of these cases.6 In this case, the
driver went out of his way 15 blocks to pick up a package
for his mother. We may then fairly assume that the total
intended deviation was at least 30 blocks (about five
miles). These circumstances, the Court held, took him
out of the scope of his employment as a matter of law. Yet
in McDowell v. Magazine Service7 the intended deviation
was 64 blocks, and the Court took the opposite view. In
that case, however, the deviation actually executed was
only about 12 blocks in a trip of 20 miles as compared with
about 20 blocks in the principal case, where the total authorized trip would have been only 6 or 7 miles.
The two cases are, in many ways, similar, but in the
McDowell case the purpose of the deviation was that the
servant might eat his lunch at home. It was customary
for him during his day's work to eat at any convenient
place, and the Court refused to say, as a matter of law, that
the intended deviation was beyond the scope of his employment. The reasoning for such a conclusion is based
on the extent of the deviation considered in conjunction
with the purpose.
The courts as a general rule seem to feel, where a
servant has the use of his master's vehicle in going to and
from his work, or his meals, in conjunction with his employment, whether such journey is expressly authorized
or not, that a jury might well find that such journeys are
not exclusively for his own benefit, but are within the
scope of his employment. But in the principal case the
agent was serving his own interest in going to Gwynn Oak
McDowell v. Magazine Service, 164 Md. 170, 173, 164 A. 148, 149 (1933).
39 C. J., Master and Servant, Sec. 1493: "The liability of the master
depends upon the degree of deviation and all the attending circumstances."
Supra, n. 2.
Mech v. Storrs, supra, n. 2; McDowell v. Magazine Service Co., supra,
n. 2; Silent Automatic Sales Corp. v. Stayton, 45 F. (2nd) 471 (C. C. A.
8th, 1931) ; Auer v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 103 N. J. L. 372, 137 A. 555, 54 A. L. R.
623 (1927).
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Junction and to his mother's, to the complete exclusion
of that of his employer. His employer could not have even
the remotest interest in the parcel he intended to deliver
to his mother. He had even signed a card agreeing that
he would not use the car on any business other than his
employer's. Of course, the principal's liability to third
persons for the torts of his agent cannot be abnegated by
a secret contractual agreement,9 but the breach of such
an agreement by an agent might be of some value in
determining whether the agent has intentionally abandoned his employment.
One more similarity may be noted between this and
the McDowell case. In the latter, the Court seemed to
stress that the employer still had some bottles to be returned to his employer, and rather implied that in such
a case, as his intent was ultimately to return the bottles,
he had not completely abandoned his employment. This
reasoning had no effect on the ultimate solution of the
case, and the emphasis would seem to be entirely misplaced, for even if the employee were returning an empty
truck, it is submitted that he would still be acting within
the scope of his employment. In the instant case, the
agent had proof yet to be delivered, but the Court refused
to consider the contention that this had any bearing on
the case. By the better view, it is no more than a neutral
factor, for even though it may be inferred that the servant
intends to resume his task, yet, if it is clear that he is on
a frolic of his own, even temporarily, his master is not
liable for his negligence."°
9Julian Goldman Stores v. Bugg, 156 Md. 36, 143 A. 589 (1928) ; Emison
v. Wylam Ice Cream Co., 215 Ala. 504, 111 So. 216 (1927).
10 In Jordan Stabler Co. v. Tankersly, 146 Md. 454, 126 A. 65 (1924) the
Court seemed to stress the fact that there were still undelivered goods of
the employer on the truck; but their holding was that the evidence in the
case was not sufficient to rule as a matter of law that the agent was
acting beyond the scope of his employment, overcoming the presumption to
the contrary. Another case in which some stress seems to be laid on the
fact that there were undelivered goods in the truck is International Co. v.
Clark, supra, n. 4. The Court held that this, in conjunction with the other
surrounding circumstances, raised a question as to whether or not the
agent was acting within the scope of his agency, and left it to the jury.
The decision is a poor one on which to rely for any substantive law for
although the Court states the rule that "where the facts so offered are
undisputed and uncontradicted, it becomes properly a question for the
Court" yet it superimposes the pusillanimous qualification that "where the
facts are such as to leave the Court in doubt as to the question the proper
course is to submit the question to the jury". An almost exact reconstruction of the facts in this case is presented in illustration 5 in Section 237 of
the Restatement of Agency (1933) where its collaborators have no difficulty in saying that the agent would not be acting within the scope of his
employment. Butt v. Smith, 148 Md. 340, 129 A. 352 (1925) properly
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The view of the Maryland courts in regard to deviation,
where the employer owns the vehicle driven by someone
in his general employ, conceding that each case presents
an individual problem, seems to be that there is a presumption that the agent is acting for his principal.:" This may
be rebutted, 12 and if by conclusive and uncontradicted testimony, the principal is as a matter of law relieved from
liability."5 To rebut this presumption the Court must find
that the agent was acting exclusively in his own interests."
The criterion applied to the facts must of necessity be
somewhat flexible, for the agent is not limited to the most
direct route, nor even to express orders, but if he takes
a plausible way of going (in the absence of further evidence) the principal is bound.'The one remaining contention advanced by the appellee here was that when the agent left Gwynn Oak Junction,
he was travelling in the general direction of his next delivery, and so intended to resume his duties. Arguing that
the intent was mixed, the appellee contended that, conceding a complete prior relinquishment of his duties, the
servant had returned within the nebulous bounds of his
employment. The Court rejected this, citing Pollock v.
Watts 6 as Maryland authority. Pollock v. Watts in fact
does not consider the question.
To constitute a resumption of employment, there must
be an intention so to resume. 7 This intention may somestates that the fact of undelivered goods on a truck, standing alone, has no
bearing on the employer's liability and that ". . . there is not a word of
evidence showing that the driver had been directed to deliver the tomatoes
to anyone, nor is there any evidence that he was trying to deliver them".
11Symington v. Sipes, supra, n. 3; Debelius v. Benson, 129 Md. 693,
100 A. 505 (1916) ; Dearholt v. Merritt, 133 Md. 323, 105 A. 316 (1918) ;
Pollock v. Watts, supra, n. 3; Jordan Stabler Co. v. Tankersly, supra,
n. 10; Salowitch v. Kres, 147 Md. 23, 127 A. 643 (1925) ; Butt v. Smith,
supra, n. 10; Wells v. Hecht Bros Co., supra, n. 4; Wagner v. Page, supra,
n. 3.
12 Ibid.

Ibid.
"See cases cited supra, n. 3.
"Jordan Stabler Co. v. Tankersly, supra, n. 10; RESTATEMENT, AcENCY
(1933) Sec. 234.
Supra, n. 3.
S6
"See the following cases: Erdman v. Horkheimer & Co., 169 Md. 204,
181 A. 221 (1935). In this case a cab driver, during his hours of employment, visited a local tavern and became intoxicated. He testified that he
remembered nothing. However, Judge Parke carefully points out in his
opinion that evidence was offered purporting to show that the driver "was
capable of volition" and also was transporting a passenger in the course
of his business. Under the conflicting evidence the jury found that the
driver had resumed his employment. A. & P. Co. v. Noppenberger 171 Md.
378, 189 A. 434 (1937), where it is stated by Judge Offutt ". . . to be 77ithin
the scope of the employment, the conduct must be of the kind the actor is
13
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times be inferred when the purpose of the deviation has
been completed.'
At this point there is a great divergence of authority.
Some jurisdictions have held that facts showing simply
an intent to resume are sufficient to bind the employer. 19
Some others hold that the employee must return within a
reasonable proximity of his employment." The third possible view is that the agent must have returned to
21 the point
of departure to bind the principal for his torts.
The contention of the appellee that the agent has resumed his employment is clearly inapplicable from the
facts of the case, for the primary requisite, an intent to
resume, 22 is not present. The agent's state of mind, as
found by the Court, was solely to serve his own purposes.
Simply because he happened at the time of the accident,
to be heading in the direction which would incidentally
benefit his employer cannot overrule his actual intent. The
fallacy is obvious.
employed to perform, occur not unreasonably disconnected from the authorized period of employment, in a locality not unreasonably distant from the
authorized area, and actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the
master." (italics supplied) ; Fletcher v. Meredith, supra, n. 3; Debelius v.
Benson, supra, n. 11; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933)
8

Sec. 235.

1 International Co. v. Clark, supra, n. 4; Erdman v. Horkheimer, supra,
n. 17; Glass v. Wise, 155 La. 477, 99 So. 409 (1923) ; Fiocco v. Carver, 234
N. Y. 219, 137 N. E. 309 (1922).
11 A representative jurisdiction would seem to be Louisiana. See Mancuso v. Hurwitz-Mintz Furniture Co. 181 So. 814 (La., 1938) ; rehearing
denied, 183 So. 461 (La., 1938) ; Gilvert v. Trotter, 160 So. 855 (La., 1935) ;
Cusimano v. A. S. Spiess Sales Co., 153 La. 551, 96 So. 118 (1923). In the
Mancuso case the Court stated: "We cannot understand the wisdom or
soundness of the doctrine, but must acknowledge that it is well established
and must yield our individual views." For extensive notes, see (1922) 22
A. L. R. 1397, (1925) 45 A. L. R. 477, (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1051, (1932) 80
A. 20L. R. 725, (1939) 122 A. L. R. 858.
Riley v. Standard Oil of N. Y., 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97, 22 A. L. R.
1382 (1921). This is more or less of a leading case in New York on the
subject of resumption, and it clearly states: "Should there be such a
temporary abandonment the master . . . becomes liable for the servant's
acts when the latter once more begins to act in his business. . . a re-

entry is not affected merely by the mental attitude of the servant.

There

must be that attitude coupled with a reasonable connection in time and

space with the work in which he should be engaged." For extensive notes,
see supra, n. 19.
21 Texas seems clearly to follow this view. See Southwest Dairy Products
Co. v. L. C. De Frates, 132 Tex. 556, 125 S.W. (2d) 282, 122 A. L. R. 854
(1939). It is interesting to note that this case cites Fletcher v. Meredith,
supra, n. 3, as authority for its view. This, it is submitted, is an unwarranted deduction from the opinion. The Court held that the agent had not
resumed his employment under the particular facts involved, but did not
state as law that the employee must return to the point of departure.
Rather the inference to be drawn from the language used is that the Court
would be disposed to find liability during the course of returning under a
different
fact situation. For extensive notes, see supra, n. 19.
'2 Supra, n. 17.
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But since we have stated that Pollock v. Watts," is
inapplicable, even though the question is not involved in
the principal case, what is the law of Maryland in regard
to resumption, after there has been a complete abandonment of the employment by an agent
One of the earliest expressions on the subject in Maryland is found in InternationalCo. v. Clark2 4 where, rationalizing the Symington v. Sipes case,23 it was said: "The
facts . . . without contradiction showed that there had

been a departure from the master's business and that the
accident occurred before the servant had returned to the
point of departure ...

26

If this is a proper interpretation

of Symington v. Sipes, it would seem that Maryland has
adopted the third and strictest rule above mentioned. However, it is respectfully submitted that the above statement
is not the proper interpretation, nor is the inference drawn
therefrom a sound one. In Symington v. Sipes the decision was predicated solely on the ground that the servant
was on a frolic of his own at the time of the accident. No
contention was raised that he might have resumed his
employment. Further, the fact that an agent may have
returned to the point of departure after a deviation is not
determinative of the principal's liability, for by all authorities the basic requirement is an intent to resume,27 even
though it may be possible to infer such intent by the return
itself in a proper case.2"
We have a later decision in the case of Fletcherv. Meredith2 9 where the question of resumption is directly presented. The agent borrowed his principal's car to attend
a funeral, and agreed that on the way to the funeral he
would make a delivery for his principal. The agent made
the delivery, attended the funeral, and on the return to the
garage had an accident. The Court held that the principal
was not bound, stating that "the bare fact of return toward
the garage after a personal use by the employee does not
alone constitute resumption of the employer's service; that
it may in some circumstances and in others may not." Since
the trip originated in a permissive personal use and the
delivery for the principal was incidental, the Court found
11Supra, n.

3.

21 Supra, n. 4.
_Supra, n. 3.

Italics supplied.
Supra, n. 17.

27

Supra, n. 18.
Supra, n. 3.

29
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that the intent of the agent30 was to serve his own interests
at the time of the accident.
The result of the Maryland cases on resumption, here
discussed and noted, is rather vague. While it is clear that
there must be an intent to reenter the principal's business,
we cannot say with certainty what degree of physical return is necessary. The inference to be drawn is that Maryland would follow the majority of jurisdictions, as is set
forth in the Restatement of Agency:
"A servant who has temporarily departed from the
scope of employment does not re-enter it until he is
again reasonably near the authorized space and time
with the intention of serving his
limits and is acting
3' 1
master's business.
The Fletcher v. Meredith case, 32 although it holds that
the agent was not within the scope of his employment,
nevertheless leaves adequate room for the Court to make
out a case of resumption under a different set of facts. In
A. & P. Co. v. Noppenberger,33 the Court, by way of dictum, approves of the position taken by the Restatement.
The strictest rule, that the agent must return to the point
of departure might be indicated by dicta in International
Co. v. Clark,34 but this, it is submitted, is not only too flexible to allow the Court to look into the circumstances of
the case, but manifestly unjust and unconscionable when
we consider the rights of innocent35 third persons. The
third view is stated in Corpus Juris:
"The servant will be considered to have resumed
the prosecution of the Master's business when after
the fulfillment of his own purpose he is returning to
"oThe Court of Appeals quoted extensively from this case in Phipps v.
Milligan, 174 Md. 438, 199 A. 498 (1938). That case reviews the Maryland
decisions which relate to deviation and resumption at some length. Nevertheless, the decision of the Court is contained in one sentence: "As in the
opinion of this Court, the uncontradicted and conclusive evidence is that
Miller was not, at the time of the accident complained of, the agent, servant
or employee of Phipps, the judgment against him should be reversed."
If this is to be interpreted to mean that there was simply a permissive use
by Miller, disconnected from his employment, the decision is theoretically
correct. Any other interpretation would put Maryland in the position of
having repudiated in toto the well settled principles of agency insofar as
they relate to resumption.
" RESTATEMENT, AGE cy (1933) Sec. 237.
"Supra, n. 3.
Supra, n. 17.
'4 Supra, n. 4.
39 C. J. 1298, Master and Servant, Sec. 1495.
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resume his duties; it is not necessary for him to have
reached the zone of his employment or the territory
in which he was employed to work."
This view permits injustice to be worked on the principal
in many cases, and is for that reason undesirable.
The intermediate and majority view allows the Court
to sit more or less as a jury, balancing the equities of each
individual case, and then ruling as a matter of law. This,
it might be urged, makes the rule more difficult to apply,
but nevertheless, is the only one whereby substantial
justice may be accomplished in the great majority of the
cases.
RES JUDICATA IN LICENSE DETERMINATIONS
BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
Knox v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City'
In February, 1939, appellant filed an application with
the Board of Zoning Appeals to construct a tool house on
a lot in Baltimore City, and for permission to use the lot
for the storage of building materials and trucks. The petition was based on the grounds of an alleged non-conforming use of the premises, which had been zoned residential.
The Board found that a non-conforming use had been established and approved the application. Appellant failed to
exercise his license within six months from the date it
was issued, and it therefore became null and void.2 Subsequently, in November, 1939, and again in September,
1940, appellant applied for a similar license,3 based on the
non-conforming use which had been found to exist in the
first application. In both of the subsequent hearings, how123 A. (2d) 15 (Md., 1941). See, in general, Note, The Doctrine of Res
Adjudicata (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 189.
2Baltimore City Code (1927) Art. 49, Sec. 35.
8This statement is not exactly correct, although for the purposes of its
opinion, the Court of Appeals regarded it as a similar application. The
grounds for petitioner's suit were the same in both applications, i. e., a
non-conforming use. The specific applications made by petitioner were as
follows: In February, 1939, "to construct an addition for tool storage
and to continue to use lot for storage of building materials and trucks at
4403 Alhambra Avenue." The addition was to be 10 ft. x 24 ft. In November, 1939, petitioner asked "to construct a tool house and garage at
4403 Alhambra Avenue the size to be 72 ft. x 36 ft., 6 inches." In September, 1940, the application was "to construct an addition and to continue
the use of the lot and the garage thereon for the storage of building materials and trucks." The addition was to be 24 ft. x 12 ft.

